One day after the Cease Fire, Kuwait announced plans to increase oil exports in defiance of OPEC quotas. The price of crude began to slide. In June '89, they stepped up production again. Iraq was hard hit.
[1/74.] SHAKIB OUTAKI – OIL ANALYST
‘For every fall of a dollar in the price of a barrel of oil, Iraq lost a billion dollars in income.’
While Iraq was at war, Kuwait had moved into the Rumailia oil field, shifting a border disputed since colonial times. In November, Kuwaiti officials met with the CIA and agreed:
"…to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq […] To put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The CIA gave us its’ view of appropriate means of pressure." [1]
As oil prices collapsed, Kuwait demanded that Iraq repay its’ wartime debts.
In December, the United States invaded Panama – without rebuke from the UN Security Council. The Soviet Empire was in chaos, the global ‘pattern of relationships’ changing. US War Plan 1002 – devised to counter a Russian threat in the Gulf - was updated, and now posed Iraq as the enemy.
Early in 1990, General Norman Schwarzkopf briefed congress:
"Middle East oil is the West’s lifeblood. [….] It is going to fuel us when the rest of the world has run dry." [2]
Schwarzkopf advocated a permanent US presence in the Gulf. But in the wake of Soviet collapse, there were calls to cut military spending. New enemies had to be found. A white paper was drawn up which identified Iraq and Saddam Hussein as:
"….the optimum contenders to replace the Warsaw pact." [3]
There was just one problem. According to the US Army War College:
"Baghdad should not be expected to deliberately provoke military confrontations with anyone." [4]
US intelligence indicated that Iraq’s desire was to reduce the army and repay their debts.
But high unemployment made de-mobilisation impossible, inflation on the dinar was forty percent and rising, and the price of oil continued to fall.
In May 1990, Saddam Hussein protested at Kuwait’s continuing overproduction:
"Were it possible we would have endured […] but I say that we have reached a point where we can no longer withstand pressure." [5]
The Kuwaitis were dismissive, as an American official recalled:
"When Iraqis came and said: ‘Can’t you do something about it?’ the Kuwaitis said: ‘Sit on it’. And they didn’t even say it nicely…. they were arrogant...they were terrible." [6]
Charles Allen, the CIA’s ‘Officer for Warning’ predicted that Iraq would invade Kuwait. His report was shelved.
In a diplomatic offensive, Iraq sent envoys to Arab states until Kuwait agreed to a summit. On July 10th new quotas were settled. On the 11th, Kuwait rejected them and announced plans to further increase production by October. Saddam Hussein’s patience was exhausted.
[9/63.] Dr. PHOEBE MARR - US NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
‘I think he came to believe [….] that Kuwait was over-producing oil not in its own interests but because it was goaded into that by the United States, in an effort to weaken Iraq.’
On July 15th, the Iraqis wrote to the Arab League and the UN Secretary General listing their grievances; on the 17th Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of economic warfare; on the 18th, troops were sent to the border.
Saddam Hussein summoned US Ambassador Glaspie and asked her to clarify the American position.
"I have direct instructions from the President to seek better relations with Iraq. […] Our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait." [7]
As the crisis escalated, King Hussein of Jordan went to Kuwait to try and broker a compromise, to be told:
"We are not going to respond..... If they don't like it, let them occupy our territory..... we are going to bring in the Americans." [8]
As Iraqi forces moved to the front line, the Assistant Secretary of State was questioned in Congress:
"If Iraq, for example, charged across the border into Kuwait… [….] in that circumstance, is it correct to say [….] that we do not have a treaty commitment which would oblige us to engage US forces?"
"That is correct." [9]
On the 2nd of August, Iraq invaded.
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[1] From a memo found by the Iraqis after the invasion of Kuwait, a copy of which they submitted to former UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. The CIA have disputed its authenticity but former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark claims that ‘...many experts...’ vouch that it is genuine. The meeting allegedly took place between CIA director William Webster and Kuwaiti Brigadier Fahd Ahmed al Fahd at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, USA. The memo was sent by the Brigadier to the Kuwaiti Interior Minister, Sheikh Salem al-Salem al Sabah, to summarise the agreements reached at the meeting. The memo also discussed training for 128 CIA bodyguards for the Kuwaiti Royal Family and intelligence exchanges about Iraq and Iran. It was dated November 20th 1989 according to Geoff Simons in 'Iraq - From Sumer to Saddam' and November 22nd according to Ramsey Clark in 'The Fire This Time'. [2] 'Threat assessment, Military Strategy, and Operational Requirements' - Testimony by H. Norman Schwarzkopf to 'Senate Committee on Armed Services’ February 8th 1990. "Middle East oil is the West’s lifeblood. It fuels us today and being 77 percent of the Free World’s proven oil reserves, is going to fuel us when the rest of the world has run dry. [...] Our allies are even more dependent on Middle East oil. Japan gets almost two-thirds of its oil from the area while our allies in Europe import over one quarter."[3] From United States Army publication, ‘A Strategic Force for 1990/2 and Beyond' - as quoted by John Pilger in 'Distant Voices' Vintage Books 1992 (chapter: 'Sins of Omission.') He gives the above as a source but in the chapter attributes the report to the National Security Council . His footnote dates the publication as January 1990; in the chapter he says Bush received the white paper in May 1990. Ramsey Clark additionally quotes in 'The Fire This Time' a different part of the report and attributes it to General Carl E. Vuono, US Army Chief of Staff. [4] Excerpt from a study issued in early 1990 by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College: ‘Baghdad should not be expected to deliberately provoke military confrontations with anyone. Its interests are best served now and in the immediate future by peace […] Revenues from oil sales could put it in the front ranks of nations economically. […] Force is only likely if the Iraqis feel seriously threatened […] It is our belief that Iraq is basically committed to a non-aggressive strategy and that it will, over the course of the next few years, considerably reduce the size of its military. Economic conditions practically mandate such action.’[5] Saddam Hussein speaking at an Arab Summit on 30th May 1990, as quoted in Geoff Simons 'Iraq - From Sumer to Saddam' [6] An unidentified ‘...senior Bush administration official...’ quoted by New York Newsday, January 21st 1991 [7] Former US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie, meeting with Saddam Hussein, July 25th 1990. US State Department transcripts have been published in James Ridgeway's ‘The March to War’ Four Walls and Eight Windows, New York 1991 (page 28). Also in Pierre Salinger and Eric Laurent's ‘Secret Dossier - The Hidden Agenda Behind the Gulf War’ Penguin, Harmondworth 1991, and ‘The Gulf War Reader’, Times Books, Random House, New York 1991, editors Michael Sifry and Christopher Cert.On 20th September 1990,
seven weeks after the invasion of Kuwait, Glaspie was interviewed by the New York Times,
during which she remarked: "I didn't think, and nobody else did, that the Iraqis
were going to take ALL of Kuwait." [9] Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John Kelly, questioned by Representative Lee Hamilton. 'Developments in the Middle East, July 31st 1990 - Report of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs', House of Representatives (Washington DC : US Government Printing office, 1990) According to Salinger and Laurent in their book 'Secret Dossier', this exchange between Kelly and Hamilton was broadcast on radio and heard in Iraq.
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